

## Functions of modal verbs on the ground their classifications

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**Abstract.** This investigation is connected with the English modal verbs and takes into consideration the relation between their functions and classifications. Being involved into different grammatical and semantical structures modal verbs demonstrate variety of functions which may be explained on the basis of the verb classifications. Verb classifications not only show their recognative features but also reveal multifunctional nature of that verb subclass. Differentiation of central, marginal and periphery level modals explains the existence of different types of modality.

**Keywords:** *central modal, marginal modal, modal verb, semi-auxiliary.*

The class of verbs falls into a number of subclasses distinguished by different semantic and lexico-grammatical features. On the upper level of division two unequal sets are identified: notional verbs and semi-notional and functional verbs. The last ones serve the connection between the nominative content of the sentence and reality in a strictly specialized way. These “predicators” include auxiliary verbs, modal verbs, semi-notional verbal introducer verbs, and link-verbs. Auxiliary verbs constitute grammatical elements of the categorial forms of the verb. These are the verbs *be, have, do, shall, will, should, would, may, might*. Modal verbs are used with the infinitive as predicative markers expressing relational meanings of the subject attitude type, i. e. ability, obligation, permission, advisability, etc. By way of extension of meaning, they also express relational probability, serving as probability predicators. These two types of functional semantics can be tested by means of correlating pure modal verb collocations with the corresponding two sets of stative collocations of equivalent functions: on the one hand, the groups *be obliged, be permitted*, etc.; on the other hand, the groups *be likely, be probable*. The modal verbs *can, may, must, shall, will, ought, need, used (to), dare* are defective in forms, and are suppletively supplemented by stative groups [1, p.86-87]. Belonging to auxiliary and modal verb groups simultaneously these verbs demonstrate the correlation between functions and meaning. This correlation investigation is the main aim of this article. The best way of finding the dependence between function and meaning is the tracing of different subgroups.

The scheme [13, p. 136-148] involves four distinct categories between central modals and full verbs, listed as (b) – (e) below; although these categories are listed separately, they are treated as, ultimately, constituting a gradient: (a) central modals (*can, could, may, might, shall, should, will, would, must*); (b) marginal modals (*dare, need, ought, to, used to*); (c) modal idioms (*had better, would rather, would sooner, be to, have got to, would (just) as soon, may/ might (just), as well, had best*); (d) semi-auxiliaries (*have to, be able to, be about to, be bound to, be going to, be obliged to, be supposed to, be willing to, be apt to, be due to, be likely to, be meant to, be unable to, be unwilling to*); (e) catenatives (*appear to, keen + -ing*); (f) main verbs. To consider these subcategories in turn, (a) is the set of items that fully meet the NICE criteria [11, p. 14-21]; while (b) contains the four items that do so restrictedly; (c) is a group of items that are auxiliary like in that their first element is an auxiliary and modal-like in that they have no non-finite forms, and

thus cannot co-occur with modals. Presumably the modal idioms, like the preceding two categories, are to be considered a closed set. Group (d) are also idiomatic structures, formed of *be X* (*X* being an adjective or participle, with the sole exception of *about*), a part from the item *have to*. These items differ crucially from the modal idioms in that they do have non-finite forms and can co-occur with modals. A striking feature of this syntactically based classification is the fact that the items *have to* and *have got to* are listed in different sets, although semantically they are always treated as close, if not synonymous. The boundaries of class (d) are not clear, and the last two items are introduced as doubtful members; the reasons for this, and the status of other possible members, will be discussed later. Catenatives, group (e), are more obviously an open class, and can simply be treated as main or lexical verbs that enter into particular syntactic structures, while having certain syntactic and semantic similarities to semi-auxiliaries. “Quasi-modals” are used as a cover for items that lie between the status of full/true modals and that of full/main/lexical verbs, partly because it appears to be the term most widely used [12]. Other terms used in this area include “quasi-auxiliaries” [6], “semi-modals” [10], “semi-auxiliaries” [7], “quasi-auxiliary modal expressions” or “non-auxiliary modal expressions” [12], and “lexical auxiliaries” or “lexico-modal auxiliaries” [2]. The term “catenatives” (as used, for example [14]) covers a markedly broader area. It is used in the text according to traditions [9], but has been used rather differently in the American tradition. For Twaddell, being catenatives is “a property of a construction, not of given verbs [14, p. 22]”, and he applies the term variously to items termed “catenatives” in the text above as well as to “decaying modals” such as *ought to* and to items such as *be going to*.

It is necessary to say that the items *must, have to, have got to* should be discussed in much more detail than the other sets of modals and periphrastics, for reasons such as the following. Firstly, *must* and *have to* and, to a much lesser degree, *have got to*, have received for more discussion in the literature than other items, and a wide variety of descriptive claims have been made for semantic distinctions between them. Secondly, *must* and *have to* have been treated as the paradigm case for modal-periphrastic pairs [8]. Thirdly, *have (got) to* is a quantitatively dominant item, being one of the most frequently used of the periphrastic discussed here-sometimes, possibly, even more than *must*. Fourthly, *have got to* has received very little individual treatment.

Finally, the very variety of accounts of differences among these items constitutes a challenge, since they can hardly all be equally valid in their observations. *Need (to)* and *be bound to* are also included in the discussion here, but they will only be given brief treatment. The introduction of *need (to)* involves blurring the contrast between modal and periphrastics, since it functions both as a marginal modal, alongside *ought to*, etc., and as a full lexical verb, and is thus, with in our terms, typical neither of modals nor of periphrastics. While *need (to)* is discussed in close relation to *must* and *have (got) to*, *be bound to* is treated separately, since it is semantically much less close to *must* than the other items are.

The first subject to consider is the possibility sometimes argued for that *must* and *have (got) to* are, aside from formal restrictions and suppletive functions, partially or completely synonymous. The following texts all, in various ways suggest a high degree of equivalence between the items: (1) *As a teacher, you must learn to recognize them and do your best to help all your pupils realize their potential – you have to be able to think on your feet, continually adapting your lesson to the feedback you get from them* [23, p.13]. (2) *While graduates of other English universities must spend another year in study after their final BA exams to change from being bachelors to masters all Oxford graduates have to do is wait a few years and make sure they have paid their college bills* [24, p.19]. (3) *I can live with the arrangement, I can live with the general idea, and the details will sort themselves out perfectly well. They will because they must, they've got to. We're all under necessity* [20, p.187]. (4) *But teachers live in the present. They have to teach now rather than wait for a whole L2 learning framework to emerge. They must get on with meeting the needs of the students, even if they still don't know enough about L2 learning* [17, p.152]. (5) *They have been understanding with me since Lockerbie and they have put up with a lot but sometimes people just have to do what they must* [25, p. 2]. (6) *"I'm afraid I've got to be off now. My parents have come to see me unexpectedly." He paused, to give room for any cries of protest and regret. When none came, he hurried on: "Thank you very much for putting me up, Mrs. Welsh; I've enjoyed myself very much. And now I'm afraid I really must be off. Goodbye, all"* [16, p. 36 – 37]. (7) *You've got to go, young man. We need your bed. This is a New Zealand hospital and we must put our town lads first. We've had a signal warning us to prepare for casualties... So, there's nothing for it. We have to accommodate them* [19, p. 441]. (8) *and I and I think that's all you've got to do – you don't have to be elaborate with them in any way* [15, p. 328, 1395 – 1397]. (9) *In these photographs were genuine, and if these things were all found together, they had to be, what I hardly dared put in words* [18, p.14]. (1) and (2) show *must* followed by *have to*, in parallel functions ("this is what being a teacher involves" / "this is what is needed for a BA to become an MA"), while in (3) *must* is immediately followed by *have got to* as if it is an alternative or preferred formulation. If the order *must...have (got) to* illustrated in (1) – (3) suggests that *have (got) to* is in some sense "stronger", in that the later position tends to carry more important information (according to the

principle of end-weight, cf [13, p. 1361-1362]), examples (4) – (6) show the reverse order, with *have (got) to* preceding *must*. It is also worth noting that (1) and (4) are similar both in content and in stylistic level. There is possibly, however, a subtle distinction here: whereas in (1), for example, *must* and *have to* are roughly parallel in function, in (4) *have to* reports a general requirement and the succeeding *must* functions to provide illustrative detail. (9) also shows the order *have to – must*, and this is a more telling case, since the items are juxtaposed as if in repetition. (7) has all three items in one speech: *have got to* is used for a second person obligation – the closest in this text to giving an order, while *must* and *have to* are used for parallel reported first person obligation. The latter two might possibly be felt to differ in that the *have to* obligation is imposed from outside (the speaker has been warned to prepare) while the *must* obligation expresses a more general principle; but the two items are easily interchangeable. (8) shows *have to* and *have got to* in juxtaposition: there seems to be no difference in effect if the uses are reversed, as in ... *that's all you have to do – you haven't got to be elaborate...*, so, again, equivalence between the items is strongly suggested. Finally, (9) shows *had to* and *must* together, for past time reference, in free indirect speech. It is not necessary to speculate here about the effect of the uses of these items in the texts discussed, but it is abundantly clear that at least in some contexts there is minimal distinction between them. Some of these texts will, however, be returned to in the description below. It should be noted that eight of the nine texts discussed are from writing (journalism, fiction and popular academic *-ie*, relatively informal), and only one from free conversation, and all are in British English.

It is more difficult to show *need (to)* in close contiguity with the other items, but the next text may suffice to suggest a close semantic relatedness between *need to* and *must*. Normally *need to* is considered to indicate a weaker requirement than *must*, but in the following no absolute difference is evident: (10) *A country's success needs to be judged not by the spectacular wealth of those at the top, nor even by its prosperity inside average sense, important though that is. It must be judged by the well-being of its poorest and most vulnerable* [22, p. 19]. Here both modal verbs refer to how wealth is to be judged in terms of various sections of society, and they could be interchanged without creating any anomaly. The general aim of the present investigation is to explore the possibility that, despite evidence such as that just reviewed, there is a systematic distinction between the use of modals and that of related periphrastics, and, more specifically that this distinction may centre on a contrast between subjectivity and objectivity. In seeking some basis for exploring the distinctions between these items, it seems relevant to consider the fact that *have to* and *have got to* are relative newcomers in English in comparison with *must*. *Have to* entered English late and was apparently relatively rare till very recently [5, p. 204-205]. This suggests that *have to* may be both narrower or more specialized in its use than *must*, and felt in some ways to be less widely established. The relevant meaning of *have* is explained in a different way. To possess as a duty or thing to be done. With object and dative infinitive expressing what is to be done by the subject with infinitive: to be under obligation, to be

obliged; to be necessitated *to do something*. It forms a kind of Future of obligation or duty. It has been claimed that *have to* can be used to convey no more than an intention to perform a future activity, with no element of obligation, and it has been suggested, on the basis of uses such as the following (*What are you doing tonight? Oh, I have to go to a party*) that the item could in time weaken into a marker of pure futurity [3, p. 59]. This would parallel developments in Romance, since the origin of *have to* can be related to the type of Romance formation illustrated in the French future *-ai* ending. The association of *have to* with *have* in the definition is argued that there is only one item *have*, and when this has a *to*-infinitive complement the interpretation is some individual (the subject of *have*) bears an unspecified but pragmatically predictable relation to an obligation or desideratum. The notion that with *have to* an obligation is something that a subject may possess as a duty or thing to be done clearly suggests an orientation in the use of the item towards an external definable, existing obligation, and – particularly since this accords with many proposals, this will be adopted as a hypothesis in examining its use in contrast to that of *must* here. As to the status of *have got to*, which seems only to have been in regular use since the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century [4, p. 51-52], and is much more restricted in its applications and the notion will be adopted here that its use is associated with emphasis [4, p. 53]. Probably, it expresses “affective modality”, a kind of emotional loading that standard types of modality may receive. These observations are in principle independent of any question of stylistic differentiation between it and *have to*. In contrast to these items, *must* is relatively generally or vaguely characterized in terms of necessity, obligation, or “a fixed or certain futurity”. *Need (to)* has been discussed rather little so far. Modal *need* differs from the other items in normally being restricted to a non-assertive use. However, *need to*, specifically in the form *needed to*, is often seen as comparable in meaning to *have to/had to*. As a simple demonstration of possible difference here one could compare the following pair: (11) *I have to get up at 7 am every day*. (12) *I need to get up at 7 am every day*. An evident discussion here is that *need to* focuses on the existence of personally motivating reasons for an action rather than its necessity; and this observation will be adapted. In view of these considerations, the following minimal hypothesis is proposed as a basis for the description of *must/ have to/ have got to/ need (to)* in this chapter, with primary reference to deontic uses but potential extension to epistemic ones: Assuming an “obligation/ necessity” that some proposition be fulfilled, (a) *must* makes a maximally unqualified statement as to the requirement; (b) *have to* focuses on the obligation/ necessity as an independent, existing entity; (c) *have got to* differs from *have to* in adding some degree of urgency or emphasis; and (d) *need (to)* focuses on the motivation for the requirement. At the same time, the first three items are treated as being, at least potentially, cognitively synonymous. (a-d) take no account of the possible relevance of varietal or stylistic factors to distinctions in the use of the items.

The proposal set out in (a-d) assumed that the set *must*, *have to* and *have got to* are, in semantic terms, cognitively equivalent but can be considered as separate items. There

is certainly ample evidence that these items are close in their uses to the extent that they are often more or less interchangeable. However, since the uses of *have to* and *have got to* are relatively recent developments, it is reasonable to assume that they will show meaning that both are more specific than that of *must* and reflect their origin. The following comments apply in the first instance to deontic uses of the items in present tense forms. The evidence suggests that *must* is a very general marker of “necessity”/ “obligation”, just as, for example, *can* is of “possibility”, and that any appearance of more specific meaning is to be attributed to pragmatic interpretation. This was shown to explain the use of *must* for, variously, absolute, unqualified, unconditional, urgent, immediate, irresistible, spontaneous, or unique requirements, and the expression of the speaker’s wishes or his sympathy with the subject or the obligation. This issue is highlighted in the stark contrast between the often claimed characteristic – or even obligatory – association of *must* with the expression or imposition of the speaker’s will the evidence produced here which suggests that such a use, far from being typical, is in fact hard to document. *Have to* focuses on an external, existent obligation that can be perceived or described independently of the speaker. In specific contexts, an obligation may appear, for example, habitual/ general, timeless or distinct from the speaker. *Have got to* is a variant of this form found in colloquial contexts, but is emphatic and presents an obligation as relatively urgent, and may in particular contexts appear, for example, to require immediate fulfilment, be specific in reference or be stronger than *have to*, and may also make the strongest possible statement of a speaker-based requirement. Because of this, *have got to* sometimes appears semantically closer to *must* than to *have to*.

All this results in certain typical contexts of use relating to specific interpretations; and thus we have default or favoured interpretations – eg, that the speaker of a *must* sentence supports the requirement, or that a *have to* requirement arises outside the speaker. There also are a number of idiomatic or fossilized uses, where the “obligation” sense has lost its force – eg, the *I really must be going*, *You must come and see us* and *I have to go to a party* (for an intention) types discussed above. Aside from these issues, the importance of style and variety in the choice of these items has been demonstrated at several points. The colloquial nature of *have got to* is well known, but an association of some uses of *have to* informal and of *must* to formal usage was also shown to be a significant variable. This entails that stylistically neutral comments on the use of these items can only have limited validity, and makes the determination of core uses of the items that much more difficult. It also results in complex interaction between stylistic and other contextual factors, as will be shown below. Distinctions in use between varieties, primarily British English and American English, have on occasion been noted, but, firstly, this has not been done systematically since that would itself be a major undertaking, and, secondly, the evidence here suggests that significant distinctions may not in fact be very great. A particular type of possible contrast between *must* and *have to* which relates strictly to discourse functioning was noted tentatively in connection with texts. It was suggested that whereas the semantically more highly

specified *have to* was used initially, repeated reference to the requirement might be adequately expressed by the unmarked *must*. The following text – assuming that more than purely stylistically motivated variation is involved – appears to provide further illustration of this phenomenon: In history of Native American languages Sapir noted that speakers of different languages have to pay attention to different aspects of reality simply to put words together into grammatical sentences. For example, when English speakers decide whether or not to put *-ed* onto the end of a verb, they must pay attention to tense, the relative time of occurrence of the event they are referring to and the moment of speaking. Wintu speakers need not bother with tense, but when they decide which suffix to put on their verbs, they must pay attention to whether the knowledge they are conveying was learned through direct observation or by hearsay [21, p. 59]. Here the general comment referring to speakers of different languages has *have to*, but the two ensuring illustrative cases referring to English and Wintu speakers have *must*. The findings summarized above were also related to the use of non-present tense forms, and, separately, to epistemic uses. The same general observations seem to be applicable across all these uses, allowing for, for example, the suppletive functions of *have to* and, to a limited extent, *have got to*, but there are striking imbalances between the two major types of modality, in particular, in the very restricted epistemic use of *have (got/to)*, which may partly be attributed to the inherently strong speaker-centredness of epistemic modality, which thus favours *must*. Some evidence was shown that the epistemic use of *have (got/*

*to)* is not especially typical of American English, and may be related to “Objective” deduction rather than evidence leading directly to a conclusion.

*Need (to)* is distinguished from the other items in focusing on the motivation for an action as opposed to its necessity, and as such is usually weaker and not interchangeable. However, in non-assertive uses, and particularly under negation, the distinction may not be so evident, and thus there may appear to be correspondences or relations for example between *must* and *needn't* or between *have to* and *don't need to*. Evidence was shown that *need (to)* like *have to*, may indicate motivation arising internally as well as externally to the speaker.

Finally it is possible to come to the notion of markedness. Perkins [12, p. 102-104] treats the modals as a class as unmarked in relation to their periphrastic counterparts – and, in fact, all semantically equivalent forms. *Have to* can be seen as marked in relation to *must* in a number of ways: for example, it has a more specific meaning than *must* (in that it focuses on an independently existing requirement), and is temporally more specific (in that it has future and past tense forms). *Have to* is only connected with a narrowly limited “objective” area of meaning. The case of *have got to* complicates the picture, as this item cannot simply be seen as alternative form for *have to*, but, rather, has to be seen as a further marked form in relation to *must*. Such an assignment of markedness is, however, not reflected unambiguously in details of use, including frequency since, *must* has a much narrower range of use than *have (got/to)* in speech, and a wider range of use in writing.

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### **Функции модальных глаголов на основе их классификации**

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**Аннотация.** Данное исследование связано с английскими модальными глаголами и сфокусировано на взаимосвязь их функций и классификационных подходов. Будучи вовлеченными в различные грамматические и семантические структуры модальные глаголы демонстрируют разнообразие функций, которые могут быть объяснены на основе глагольных классификаций. Глагольные классификации не только демонстрируют опознавательные признаки, но также и вскрывают полифункциональную природу этого глагольного субкласса. Дифференциация центральных, маргинальных, перифрастических модальных глагольных форм объясняет существование различных типов модальности.

**Ключевые слова:** *модальный глагол, полу-вспомогательный глагол, центральный модальный глагол, маргинальный модальный глагол.*